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Abstract 
Extant literature shows that human capital by top management teams helps firm performance but does not explore 
impact of board human capital on firm innovativeness.  Anchored on agency, resource dependence and human 
capital theories, this study sought to determine impact of human capital on innovativeness in commercial banks.  
Kenya has experienced significant innovations in the banking sector driven primarily by mobile technologies.  
Examples of innovative products in the banking sector include M-Pesa, M-Kesho M-Shwari, M-Kopa and Pesalink.  
On this basis, scope of the study was banking sector in Kenya.  Empirical research has mixed findings, some 
showing board human capital positively affects innovativeness, with others showing it either has negative or no 
effect.  Consistent with logic, the study hypothesized that human capital positively impacts firm innovativeness.  
Independent variables conceptualized under this study were directors’ educational qualifications, experience and 
functional diversity.  Two control variables were added, to mitigate against their confounding effect on the 
dependent variable, bank innovativeness.  Three hypotheses were postulated under this study.  A causal research 
design was selected to focus on specific research hypotheses aimed at generating managerially actionable results. 
Under the study, purposive sampling was undertaken.  A questionnaire was developed and reviewed by two 
university faculty as well as two bank directors.  Feedback obtained from the reviews was incorporated before 
sending questionnaires to the managing directors of the 43 banks, the commercial bank universe in Kenya.  32 
questionnaires were completed and returned, constituting a response rate of 74%.  Data was reviewed and analyzed 
using statistical software, SPSS.  Assumptions made for data were tested.  Robustness tests were undertaken.  
Descriptive and inferential statistics were computed.  Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated.  Multiple 
regression was undertaken.  The study found that there was statistically significant relationship between directors’ 
educational qualifications, experience and functional diversity and innovativeness of banks.  This study helped 
resolve disagreement in extant research, by concluding that educational qualifications, board experience, 
functional diversity drive innovativeness.  This study can benefit management, in providing a selection criteria for 
directors where the entity has innovativeness as a principal focus area.  Policy makers, in promulgating corporate 
governance guidelines can also benefit from this study, by suggesting a selection criteria for directors.  Limitations 
of the study include a narrow focus on banking industry, yet future research can widen this to service sector to 
enhance generalizability.  A second limitation is use of board as unit of analysis, rather than role played by 
individual directors in innovativeness, for which future research is also recommended.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, Human Capital, Innovativeness, Kenya. 
 
1. Introduction 
Boards of directors play many roles including provision of resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), hiring chief 
executive (Masulis & Xie, 2011) and monitoring and advising management (Haynes and Hillman (2010).  In 
discharging their responsibilities, boards utilize human capital, defined by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) as 
consisting experience, expertise and reputation.  Board human capital constructs as operationalized later in this 
study include board education consistent with Wincent, Anokhin & Örtqvist (2010), Chen (2014) and Bantel & 
Jackson (1989); board functional diversity as operationalized in studies by Wincent et al., (2010), Yang (2014) 
and Jackson, May, & Whitney (1995) and board experience in line with studies by Chen (2014) and Johnson, 
Schnatterly & Hill (2013).   
There is extensive literature on role of board capital on various firm outcomes, namely firm performance 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), strategic change (Haynes & Hillman, 2010), CEO selection (Tian, Haleban and 
Rajagopalan, 2011) and firm growth (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2008).  Literature on the role of board capital on 
innovations as a firm outcome exists, but has inherent contradictions which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.  
Innovation is comprehensively defined by Crossan & Apaydin (2010) as production or adoption, assimilation and 
exploitation of a value-added novelty in economic and social spheres; renewal and enlargement of products, 
services and markets, development of new methods of production and establishment of new management systems 
and further, that it is both a process and an outcome.  I support the view espoused by Ngo & O'Cass (2013) that 
innovation is important in firm success and performance.   
Regarding studies on role of board capital on innovation that have yielded mixed results, Bantel and Jackson 
(1989), for instance, found that education, a form of human capital had no significant effect on administrative 
innovation while Dalziel, Gentry and Bowerman, (2011) found that directors’ educational qualifications negatively 
affect research and development expenditure, a proxy of innovation.  On the contrary, Subramaniam and Youndt 
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(2005), Chen (2014) and Wincent et al., (2010) found a strong association of directors’ advanced education with 
innovation.  This study sought to ascertain the impact of education held by members of the boards of directors on 
the innovativeness of firms.  In so doing, the study would reconcile inconsistent study findings as discussed 
hereabove. 
With regard to functional diversity, Wincent et al., (2010) found that functional diversity was beneficial to 
innovation.  Effect of board functional diversity, yet another form of board human capital on innovation is unclear, 
with Haynes and Hillman (2010) calling for further research to determine when diversity can be beneficial and 
when it is not.  Johnson et al., (2013) recommend further research to clarify the effect of experience, another form 
of board human capital on firm outcomes. 
This study sought to reconcile the above findings in extant literature.  Contextually, Kenya is a bedrock of 
innovations in the banking sector, with the most successful mobile money revolution being M-Pesa in Kenya, 
(Burns, 2014).  This study attempted to determine the effect of board human on innovation in the banking industry 
in Kenya.  The banking sector in Kenya is deemed a fertile ground for academic research because of the accelerated 
rate of adoption of banking innovations. 
M-Pesa, M-Kesho M-Shwari, M-Kopa and Pesalink are some of the significant banking innovations in Kenya.  
M-Pesa (M for mobile and Pesa for money in Swahili, one of the two national languages in Kenya) is a small-
value electronic payment and store of value system that is accessible on a mobile phone (Burns, 2015).  This 
mobile money service provided by Safaricom, one of the telecommunications firms in Kenya, (Eijkman, Kendall 
& Mas, 2010) was introduced in Kenya in 2007 (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012) and enables customers to deposit 
and make payments using their mobile phones.  M-Kesho (M for mobile money and Kesho for tomorrow in Swahili) 
is the interest-bearing bank integrated mobile saving system introduced in Kenya in 2010 (Demombynes & 
Thegeya, 2012). 
M-Shwari (M for mobile and Shwari for calm) is a bank account offering savings and loans to M-Pesa 
customers, (Cook & McKay, 2015).  M-Kopa, (M for mobile money and Kopa for borrow in Swahili) provides 
micro-financed energy products in Kenya to M-Pesa customers, (Nique & Opala, 2014).  In February 2017, banks 
unveiled a new service, Pesalink, that will enable customers to make real time payments without having to go 
through intermediaries.  From popular press, it is understood that PesaLink payments will be processed on Mobile, 
Internet banking, ATM, Branch and Agency Banking platforms. 
Pesalink (Pesa for money in Swahili), as reported in popular press is a real time interbank money transfer 
service available to bank customers effective July 2017, after four months of piloting.  Transactions can be initiated 
from a mobile phone, internet banking, Automated Teller Machine or in a bank’s branch or agency, with the end 
to end transaction taking less than a minute to complete.  Under Pesalink, customers can transact amounts ranging 
from Kshs. 10 upto Kshs. 999,999 at any time.  This service allows banks to share innovative infrastructure in 
delivery of cost effective and secure services to the banking community. 
 
1.1 Innovativeness of the Banking Industry in Kenya 
The financial sector in Kenya is well developed as demonstrated, for instance, by having forty-three licensed 
commercial banks, nine deposit taking micro finance institutions and over 3000 SACCOs (Omwansa & Waema, 
2014).  In recent times, excluding human resource costs, investments in technology by commercial banks is often 
the largest line item and perhaps the fastest growing (Aduda and Kingoo, 2012), perhaps all geared towards 
innovations.  Innovations in the banking industry in Kenya include adoption of Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), smart cards, internet and mobile banking (Okiro and Ndungu, 2013).  Consistent with Marfo-Yiadom 
and Ansong (2012), the Central Bank of Kenya observes that increase in the use of technology by banks has been 
driven mainly by stiff competition leading them to adopt cost effective channels in offering financial services to 
ensure efficiency and increase market share. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Research on effect of human capital on firm innovativeness has yielded mixed results.  For instance, Bantel and 
Jackson (1989) found that education, a constituent of board human capital had no significant effect on 
administrative innovation while Dalziel et al. (2011) found that directors’ educational qualifications negatively 
affect research and development expenditure, a proxy of innovation.  On the contrary however, Subramaniam and 
Youndt (2005), Chen (2014) and Wincent et al., (2010) found a strong association of directors’ advanced education 
with innovation.  Johnson et al., (2013) recommend further research to clarify the effect of experience, another 
form of board human capital on firm outcomes. 
Effect of board functional diversity, yet another form of board human capital on innovation is unclear, with 
Haynes and Hillman (2010) calling for further research to determine when diversity can be beneficial and when it 
is not.  Wincent et al., (2010) concluded that functional diversity was beneficial to innovation.  Predicated on this 
backdrop, the study sought to address the lacunae cited in the existing literature in order to find out if board human 
capital has any effect on firm’s innovativeness as no known study has been carried out within the Kenyan context. 
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The general objective of this research was to investigate the effect of board human on innovativeness of banks.  
Specific objectives included investigating effect of educational qualifications, experience and functional diversity 
of directors on innovativeness of banks.  Interaction effect of directors’ experience and directors’ education on 
innovativeness of banks was also investigated. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Innovativeness as a concept 
Innovation is the process of developing new technological knowledge and putting that knowledge to productive 
use (Lodh, 2014).  I support the view that technological developments that are not put into productive use have no 
utility, as this will be technology for the sake of it.  The level of innovation manifests itself through rolling out 
new productive processes and / or new products.  When innovation is viewed from the standpoint of an attribute 
of organisations, Bantel and Jackson (1989) refer this to innovativeness.  This study, consistent with Lodh (2014) 
conceptualises innovativeness as an attribute of the organisations that develop new technological knowledge and 
puts the knowledge to productive use.   
Crossan and Apaydin’s (2010) study of peer reviewed journals published over a 27-year period between 1981 
and 2008 result in a consolidated definition of innovation, as production or adoption, assimilation and exploitation 
of a value-added novelty in economic and social spheres; renewal and enlargement of products, services and 
markets, development of new methods of production and establishment of new management systems and further, 
that it is both a process and an outcome.  In so doing. Crossan & Apaydin (2010) traced the origin of innovation 
as a concept to Schumpeter in the late 1920’s.  This definition is comprehensive and singles out the concept of 
value-added novelty in determining whether a market player is innovative. 
This study makes use of this literature by applying the definition of innovation in the banking industry in 
which new methods of service delivery have been developed with use of technology. Innovativeness of commercial 
banks is accordingly studied as the dependent variable 
 
2.2 The Concept of Board Capital 
Board human capital, as defined by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) consists of experience, expertise and reputation.  
Boards of directors perform four roles: hiring and monitoring managers, providing information and counsel to 
managers, and linking the corporation to the external environment (Carter et al., 2010).  These roles are linked to 
the most popular theoretical frameworks used by researchers on corporate governance, namely agency and 
resource dependence theories.  These theories are discussed in later sections.  Masulis & Xie (2011) identify the 
core functions of a board as hiring, firing and compensation of managers.  These board functions as identified by 
Masulis & Xie (2011) are perhaps not a true reflection of the practice in the real corporate world.  The hiring of 
lower and middle level managers is a function of the top management team while the CEO significantly influences 
hiring his or her team, that is, the top management team. 
Directors may differ in many important characteristics, such as educational and functional background, 
industry experience, social connectedness, insider status, gender and race (Ferreira, 2007).  This is true especially 
considering that there are no formal qualifications for directorships.  Hambrick et al., (2008) observe that although 
boards are viewed as homogenous units, anecdotal evidence and available literature show that due to various 
reasons, some directors have far more influence than others.  The differences in director characteristics as 
summarised by Ferreira (2007) can be harnessed to yield competitive advantage for the focal firm.  No research 
has determined the effect of board human capital on firm innovativeness, a core source of competitive advantage.  
This research pursued this gap and attempted to generate new knowledge in ascertaining the effect of board human 
capital on firm innovativeness. 
As observed by Hambrick et al., (2008), majority of research on board of directors has been directed at board 
structures and review of existing literature confirms this.  Board human capital, principally stock of education and 
experience has received scanty scholarly attention.  One possible explanation of the relatively low attention paid 
to board capital, in contrast to board structures is the relative difficulty with which these abstract constructs can be 
conceptualised and measured.   
Consistent with Chen (2014), it is possible that board capital has a positive effect on research and investment 
which is an important determinant of a firm’s innovative capabilities.  This researcher recommended extension of 
their study beyond the realm of the Taiwanese electronics they studied to include multiple industries and countries 
to enhance generalization of their findings.  As the study relied on secondary data, the researcher also 
recommended alternative ways of gathering data.  This research pursues extensions to research as recommended 
by Chen (2014): by studying board human capital in the banking industry in Kenya and using primary data.  In 
summary, this study makes use of this literature by delineating board capital as a construct that has received 
inadequate scholarly attention, providing guidance on operationalization of board human capital, prising open 
Chen’s (2014) recommendations for extension of research all of which this study considers in taking corporate 
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governance research forward. 
 
2.3 Theoretical perspectives 
There are numerous theoretical frameworks that scholars have used to analyze corporate governance phenomenon.  
Johnson et al., (2013) summarise their synthesis of diverse literature on directors’ demography, human capital and 
social capital.  Under the study, a total of 74 theoretical and empirical studies published in peer reviewed journals 
between 1990 and 2011 were reviewed.  This meta-analysis is found useful as it consolidates the large body of 
literature into a parsimonious, theoretically grounded approach in understanding corporate governance 
phenomenon.  In the meta-analysis, sixteen theories are used by various researchers with individual director as the 
focal point.  The most prominent theories are agency, resource dependence and human capital theories.  These 
three prominent theoretical frameworks are reviewed with a view to deepening our understanding on board human 
capital as it exists in the real world. 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory as articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) advances the idea that firm managers behave 
opportunistically and require monitoring and control by the board.  OECD (2004) recommends that several board 
members be independent of management and suggests that separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO would 
further enhance independence.  An independent board, as observed by OECD (2004) would conduct the board 
business more objectively, including effectively monitoring managers.   
As observed by Roberts, McNulty & Stiles (2005), agency theory is increasingly being criticised for equivocal 
empirical findings and doubtful theoretical assumptions.  A keen scholar evaluating agency theory would 
acknowledge that this classical theory that has had profound influence on corporate governance is not without 
flaws.  First, the assumption of opportunistic behaviour has not been conclusively determined empirically. Second, 
the presumed capability by the board to monitor and control managers is perhaps premised upon symmetrical 
information.  This assumption, when viewed against the prevalence of information asymmetry between directors 
and management makes the theory a fallacy and therefore unsuitable for the study of corporate governance.   
There is vast literature in support of board independence as envisaged by both Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and OECD (2004).  However, this independence should not be viewed as a silver bullet to corporate governance 
challenges.  A plethora of problems have been witnessed in corporate governance despite promulgation of stringent 
corporate governance regulations.  Most notable corporate failures associated with corporate governance 
malpractices are Leahman Brothers that reportedly filed for bankruptcy in 2008 due to creative accounting issues 
and Enron Corporation whose failure is associated with inflation of earnings.  Accordingly, agency theory is not 
the most practical lens for understanding corporate governance.  Consistent with Johnson et al., (2013), increased 
theoretical specificity in the measurement of director characteristics is necessary with a view to moving board 
characteristics research stream forward.  This approach would ensure researchers go beyond board independence 
and deepen understanding on how board decision making affects firm outcomes.   
Despite the flaws, agency theory serves this study well by setting the ground for corporate governance 
phenomenon from which board capital, the core of this study proceeds.  Accordingly, resource dependence and 
human capital theories are reviewed for further insights on corporate governance.   
2.3.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
In coming up with this theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that firms depend on their environment to survive 
and succeed and further note that boards expect a newly appointed director to support the firm with resolving 
challenges.  This view is reinforced by Carter et al., (2010) who find boards of directors as an important link 
between the corporation and the external environment.   
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) present four main benefits of the external linkages, first, acquisition of 
information and expertise that the corporation requires in pursuit of business objectives, an example being 
innovation.  Second, directors open channels of communication with the environment, enabling dissemination and 
acquisition of information that is pertinent to the organization’s business success, including innovation.  Third, 
directors help establish linkages to the entities in the environment and entities that the corporation requires in 
pursuit of business objectives.  Fourth, directors legitimize the firm in the external environment. 
Consistent with Hillman and Dalziel (2003), the limitations of resource dependence theory as articulated by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) are apparent: the theory presents a wide range of resources that directors bring to firms 
but with little specificity of the resources or their potential value.  Hillman and Dalziel (2003), attempt to deal with 
this tension by articulating board capital (sum of human and social capital of the board) as proxy for the board’s 
ability to provide resources to the firm.  These constructs are dealt with later in this chapter. 
A critical evaluation of resource dependence theory reveals ambiguities.  The theory is not expressly clear on 
the need to appoint directors.  First, a firm should be able to procure required support or advice from consultants 
or similar service providers and thus circumvent the need for appointment of directors.  Consultants, by their nature 
specialists in their spheres of knowledge should be able to provide superior support to the firms than directors.  
With proper terms of reference, one would expect to obtain superior level of advice and support from consultants 
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relative to directors, principally because the former are specialists in a given phenomenon while the latter are 
generalists sometimes appointed based on non-objective criteria.  Second, the assumption that information flows 
in and out of the firm through directors can be faulted, principally because this role can be performed by managers 
in their interaction with the environment.  However, the theory is not in vain as independent directors can provide 
new perspectives than those held by managers who may have vested interests.  Resource dependence theory serves 
this study by setting the ground for understanding the role played by the directors in running of firms.  It is 
imperative to turn to board human and social capital theories to assess if they are perhaps better theoretical lenses 
for understanding the relationship between corporate governance and innovation.   
2.3.3 Human Capital Theory 
Human capital theory is derived from the work of Becker (1964) that addresses the role of a person’s stock of 
education, experience and skills that can be used to the benefit of the organisation.  Johnson et al., (2013) 
summarise human capital characteristics as the skills and experiences that directors can bring to the decision-
making process and which can be a source of competitive advantage.  Human capital theory appears to be more 
definitive relative to resource dependence theory in the sense that it specifies what characteristics boards should 
consider while recruiting a director.  With respect to education and consistent with logic, one would expect higher 
education standards attained by directors to be correlated with higher innovativeness driven by superior 
information processing capability. 
Dalziel et al., (2011) found that advanced education was negatively related to research and development 
expenditure, a proxy for innovation in most existing literature.  A possible explanation given by Dalziel et al., 
(2011) for this astounding finding is that educated directors may have been attracted to firms that already make 
more efficient use of research and development spending.  These inconsistent findings on the effect of education 
standards attained by the directors on innovativeness present a tension that requires academic enquiry.  Consistent 
with Chen (2014), educational level attained by directors as well as industry-specific experience were included as 
independent variables to examine the role of human capital in innovation as a measure of firm performance.  This 
theory serves this study by supplying the key human capital predictor variables for firm innovativeness, namely 
director’s education and experience. 
 
2.4 Innovation in the banking industry in Kenya 
Like majority of other businesses today, banks operate in difficult environments characterized by intensive 
competition and require deploying innovation to deliver low cost banking solutions to remain competitive, and 
Kenya is no exception. The direction and speed of innovation depends on the interaction of a series of factors, 
relating to technological opportunities, demand conditions, market structure, and the institutional environment in 
the adopting sector (Buzzacchi, 1995).  
Bantel and Jackson (1989) studied the financial services industry in the United States because it was 
undergoing an ‘innovation shift’ from traditional to non-traditional technologies and under the study, 21 bankers 
interviewed defined innovation as a program, product, or practice that was in the early stage of acceptance and use 
in the industry. In the assessment of innovations in the banking industry, products or services would therefore 
require to be in the early stages of use and acceptance. Marfo-Yiadom and Ansong (2012) in their study on the 
innovation in Ghana’s banking industry found Automated Teller Machines, telephone banking and credit cards as 
the new technology products used to deliver financial services.  
The financial sector in Kenya is well developed as demonstrated, for instance, by having forty-three licensed 
commercial banks, nine deposit taking micro finance institutions an over 3000 SACCOs (Omwansa & Waema, 
2014). In recent times, excluding human resource costs, investments in technology by commercial banks is often 
the largest line item and perhaps the fastest growing (Aduda and Kingoo, 2012), perhaps all geared towards 
innovations. Innovations in the banking industry in Kenya include adoption of Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), smart cards, internet and mobile banking (Okiro and Ndungu, 2013). Consistent with Marfo-Yiadom and 
Ansong (2012), the Central Bank of Kenya observes that increase in the use of technology by banks has been 
driven mainly by stiff competition leading them to adopt cost effective channels in offering financial services to 
ensure efficiency and increase market share. 
M-Pesa, M-Kesho M-Shwari and M-Kopa are the most significant banking innovations in Kenya. M-Pesa is 
a small-value electronic payment and store of value system that is accessible on a mobile phone (Burns, 2015). 
This mobile money service provided by Safaricom, one of the telecommunications firms in Kenya, (Eijkman, 
Kendall & Mas, 2010) was introduced in Kenya in 2007 (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012) and enables customers 
to deposit and make payments using their mobile phones.  Dalton,, Pamuk, van Soest, Ramrattan, & Uras (2017) 
in their study estimated that in Kenya, 95% households were using M-Pesa.  As manifestation of wide adoption of 
this technology, in 2013, M-Pesa transactions amounted to US$24 billion, more than half Kenya’s GDP (Burns 
2014). 
M-Kesho is the interest-bearing bank integrated mobile saving system introduced in Kenya in 2010 
(Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012), introduced into the market by Equity Bank and Safaricom.  M-Shwari is a bank 
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account offering savings and loans to M-Pesa customers, (Cook & McKay, 2015).  M-Kopa, provides micro-
financed energy products in Kenya to M-Pesa customers, (Nique & Opala, 2014).  These three products, in addition 
to M-Pesa are manifestations of an innovative mobile banking service in Kenya over the recent past.  
Pesalink (Pesa for money in Swahili), as reported in popular press is a real time interbank money transfer 
service available to bank customers effective July 2017, after four months of piloting.  Transactions can be initiated 
from a mobile phone, internet banking, Automated Teller Machine or in a bank’s branch or agency, with the end 
to end transaction taking less than a minute to complete.  Under Pesalink, customers can transact amounts ranging 
from Kshs. 10 upto Kshs. 999,999 at any time.  This service allows banks to share innovative infrastructure in 
delivery of cost effective and secure services to the banking community.  As the service had only recently been 
launched, there were no publicly available statistics on uptake of the service, specifically regarding number of 
customers who have commenced use of Pesalink and amounts of money transacted on Pesalink.  
 
2.5 Board human capital and innovation 
Human capital theory is derived from the work of Becker (1964) that addresses the role of a person’s stock of 
education, experience and skills that can be used to the benefit of the organisation.  Functional diversity is a related 
construct and we discuss here below how each of these board human capital constructs affect innovation.  In the 
subsequent paragraphs, a summary of related empirical studies where these exist as well as a critique of the same 
is provided. 
2.5.1 Educational qualifications of directors and innovation  
Available literature suggests that directors with formal education and other investments in skills are better able to 
contribute to finding creative solutions in their organizations (Wincent et al., 2010).  This is consistent with logic 
as those in possession of good education can better appraise a situation, generate and assess options and select the 
most appropriate option.  Empirical work, however, has provided mixed results regarding role of education in 
innovation.  Bantel and Jackson (1989) found that education level had no significant effect on certain types of 
innovation while Dalziel et al., (2011) found that educational degrees held by external directors negatively affect 
research and development expenditures, a proxy of innovation in extant literature.  These findings by Bantel and 
Jackson, (1989) and Dalziel et al., (2011) are puzzling, especially when viewed against earlier findings by 
Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) as well as latter findings by Chen (2014) and Wincent et al., (2010) that associate 
advanced education held by the directors with a higher information-processing capability that drive innovation.   
Drawing from resource based theory, it is likely that higher educational qualifications should provide the directors 
with higher information processing capability to deal with a vast amount of data in the banking industry.  This is 
likely to facilitate innovative capabilities as directors provide monitoring and advisory services to the firms.  This 
study sought to determine empirically how educational qualifications of directors affect innovativeness in the 
banking industry.   
2.5.2 Experience of the directors and innovation 
Drawing from resource dependence theory, scholars suggest that experience with in a particular industry affects 
the influence of a director in the board decision making process.  This is logical as decision making process is 
understood to be influenced by a person’s orientation which would be shaped by past experiences.  Johnson et al., 
(2013) in their review of theoretical and empirical studies published between 1990 through 2011 broadly classify 
experience into four: experience as CEO, venture capital experience, financial expertise and experience with 
specific activities.  In the end, they sum up that the effect of these different aspects of experience affects various 
firm outcomes differently and that scholars have to undertake further research to clarify the condition, functional 
form as well as the mechanisms of the effect.  Chen (2014) observes that directors with industry-specific experience 
will be apt in the industry’s technology, customer needs and competitive moves and will accordingly better evaluate 
the prospects of innovation.  Mumford et al., (2002) argued that leaders must possess technical and professional 
expertise for them to lead in creative efforts. 
Intuitively, technical and professional expertise yield from a combination of education and hands on 
experience and consistent with Chen (2014), it is possible that the more the experience in the banking industry, 
the more innovative the directors will be.  There is merit in thinking that firms operating in competitive markets 
that forces players to leverage on innovation are likely to seek directors who have had prior experience with 
innovation.  One hypothesis is developed to take into account directors’ experience in banking industry, either as 
employees or directors.  
2.5.3 Functional diversity in the board and innovation 
Johnson et al., (2013) observe that scholars have investigated effects of board heterogeneity with conflicting 
conclusions.  For instance, board heterogeneity can have either potential for diversity of opinions that can create 
board conflict or enhance a firm’s access to resources.  Accordingly, board heterogeneity can be a double-edged 
sword as it can enable a firm to either prosper or stagnate.  Building on available literature on group heterogeneity 
(Jackson et al., 1995) which finds more heterogeneous groups to be more creative, it is likely that heterogeneous 
boards will have higher knowledge stocks, a prerequisite for innovation. 
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There is reason to support heterogeneous boards, consistent with Yang (2014) who posit that less 
heterogeneous boards lead to myopic thinking which impedes recognition of creative opportunities.  Haynes and 
Hillman (2010) sum up their findings on board heterogeneity by pointing to the on-going tension between 
beneficial and non-beneficial heterogeneity and recommend further research to determine when diversity can be 
good or when it can be bad.  One is persuaded to think, consistent with Wincent et al., (2010) that functional 
diversity is beneficial to innovation due to the benefits that can accrue from diversity of opinions and ideas enabling 
fast and fine-grained synthesis of complex emerging trends, as characterised by banking industry that serves an 
increasingly technologically-aware clientele.  This study tested the effect of directors’ functional diversity on 
innovativeness of banks. 
 
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
From review of extant literature, the independent variables, from which plausible relationships with the dependent 
variables are hypothesized, are shown in the conceptual framework in figure 2.1, below. The independent and 
dependent variables are operationalized in chapter three. 
Conceptual Framework of how Board human capital affects innovativeness. 
Figure 2.1: Interrelationship between variables subsumed in the study 
 
3. Methodology 
This is a causal research in which the effect of board human capital on innovativeness of commercial banks was 
investigated.  Causal research design was preferred over exploratory or descriptive research designs as this study 
focused on specific research hypothesis aimed at generating managerially actionable results (Zikmund et al., 2012). 
 
3.1 Target population 
Consistent with Aduda and Kingoo (2012), the target population consisted of all the commercial banks in Kenya.  
Under the study, board human capital of the boards as well as the innovativeness of the banks were ascertained 
from questionnaires completed by at least one director of the forty-three banks.  
 
3.2 Sample size and sampling method 
The sample size was forty-three and this study employed purposive sampling technique.  The sample size of 43 
was appropriate for multiple regression, consistent with Hair et al, (2010) who opine that small samples, 
characterized by fewer than 30 observations are only appropriate for simple regression with a single independent 
variable.  As the study specified three independent variables, the researcher took special care to ensure that 
completed questionnaires exceeded 30, the threshold for use of multiple regression analysis as espoused by Hair 
et al, (2010.  One of the tactics deployed by the researcher was to send out questionnaires to the managing directors 
of the forty-three banks.  This way, response rate would be enhanced if questionnaires are addressed to the 
organisational representatives, i.e. to managing directors, rather than to individuals, consistent with Baruch (1999).  
Also, like the approach used by Bantel & Jackson (1989), follow up mails were sent to the respondents who had 
not responded within a month of sending the questionnaires out.  Where responses were not obtained, telephonic 
follow up was made with the executive assistants of the managing directors.  When the follow ups bore no fruit, 
the researcher chose to obtain responses from either an independent director, chairman, company secretary or chief 
finance officer of the banks, all of whom were deemed to be knowledgeable of the constructs under study.  
 
3.3 Data collection 
This study made use of both primary and secondary data.  Table 3.1 includes definition of the data collected as 
well as the source.  Primary data was collected mainly from managing directors of commercial banks via use of 
questionnaires.  Following Buzzacchi et al., (1995), care was taken to ensure presence in the sample of large, 
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medium and small tier banks.  Where questionnaires were not received from some bank tiers, telephonic follow 
up was done.  The directors were assured that the data was being collected for academic purposes only and that 
confidentiality will be observed.  Personalized letters (see appendix 1) accompanying the questionnaires were sent 
to the directors using the postal addresses of the respective banks, see appendix 6.  These letters stated the purposes 
of the research and how the results were going to be used.  A research assistant was hired to help with data 
collection and coding.  The data was collected between the months of April through to October 2016, after mailing 
the questionnaires earlier, in April 2016.   
3.5.1 Validity and Reliability 
Construct validity was achieved through initial discussions with at least two members of board of directors in the 
commercial banks.  These two directors were not part of the final list of sampled directors.  Also, discussions were 
held with two members of university faculty prior to sending out the questionnaires, primarily to ensure face 
validity, criterion validity as well as content validity.  These reviews helped address clarity of the questions as well 
as whether the scales captured the desired information.  Review by university faculty ensured that the study 
incorporate expert research experience accumulated in the faculty.  Feedback obtained from the reviews was 
incorporated into the final questionnaire.  Consistent with Subramaniam and Youndt (2005), reliability was tested 
by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for each board human capital constructs.  The coefficient alphas were 
compared with the suggested value of 0.60 in deciding whether the measures utilized in this study were acceptably 
reliable, (Zikmund et al., 2012).  
3.5.2 Measurement of Variables 
There were three independent variables measuring board human capital.  Two control variables were included to 
ensure that the findings were not confounded by the effect of either the age of the firm or firm performance.  Board 
human capital was measured using three variables.  Consistent with Bantel and Jackson (1989), Wincent et al., 
(2010) and Dalziel et al., (2011), directors’ educational qualifications was one of the variables representing board 
human capital.  Second, directors’ experience was also included similar to the study by Chen (2014).  Functional 
diversity in the board of directors was included as a variable to represent board human capital similar to studies 
by Haynes and Hillman (2010) as well as Wincent et al., (2010). 
Innovativeness, as defined by Lodh (2014) and Crossan & Apaydin (2010) was the dependent variable.  Regarding 
the control variables, firm performance was controlled for in keeping with the studies by Jermias & Gani (2014) 
as well as Chen et al., (2013).  Firm age was controlled for consistent with Chen et al., (2014). 
3.5.2.1 Educational qualifications of directors  
Available literature shows that information on education is easy to gather.  Wincent et al., (2010) operationalized 
board education as the total number of directors with at least a university degree.  Johnson et al., (2010) indicates 
attendance at elite schools as the other practical operationalization of director’s education.  Attendance at elite 
schools would be difficult to gather as there is no such categorization of schools in Kenya.  For the purposes of 
this study, directors’ educational qualifications were obtained from the respondents’ answers to question 1d.  Using 
a 5 point Likert scale, the respondents were asked to indicate their agreement to the statement that ‘Directors of 
our banks’ board possess at least one academic degree’.  A score of 1 indicated strong disagreement with the above 
statement with a score of 5 indicating strong agreement.  Consistent with logic, it was anticipated that the higher 
the boards’ academic qualifications, the higher the banks’ innovativeness. 
3.5.2.2 Industry – specific experience of the directors 
Review of extant literature indicates varied methodologies of operationalizing experience.  Chen (2014) 
operationalized director’s industry-specific experience in terms of number of posts held.  Occupants of two or 
more posts were categorized as highly experienced while those who held one or no such post were categorized as 
poorly experienced or inexperienced.  Director’s experience was measured with use question 1a and 1b.  Using a 
5 point Likert scale, the respondents were asked to indicate their agreement to the statements that ‘Directors of our 
board have experience in other banks as employees’ and ‘Directors of our board have experience in other banks as 
board members’.  A score of 1 indicated strong disagreement with the above statements, with a score of 5 indicating 
strong agreement.  Consistent with logic, it was anticipated that the higher the experience, the higher the banks’ 
innovativeness. 
3.5.2.3 Functional diversity in the board 
Functional diversity has been operationalized in numerous ways chief among them a count of the number of 
different professions represented on the board, Wincent et al., (2010).  For the purposes of this study, functional 
diversity will be measured with use of question 1e. Using a 5 point Likert scale, the respondents were asked to 
indicate their agreement to the statement that ‘There is functional diversity in our board due to the variety of 
professional backgrounds in our board of directors’.  A score of 1 indicated strong disagreement with the above 
statement, with a score of 5 indicating strong agreement.  Consistent with logic, the higher the degree of diversity, 
the higher the anticipation of higher innovativeness. 
3.5.2.4 Dependent variable: Innovativeness 
Extant literature shows various methodologies of operationalization of innovativeness as a construct.  Zheng (2010) 
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reviewed empirical studies on the relationship of social capital and innovation and identified four measures of 
innovation.  First, number of innovative outcomes such as patent counts.  Second, subjective ratings such as 
evaluation by senior managers or directors.  Third, efforts expended in innovative activities such as resource 
allocation and fourth, emphasis on innovation such as inclusion of innovation in the company vision.  Considering 
contextual factors, we picked on the second operationalization and sought to rely on the directors’ assessment of 
the innovativeness of the banks where they serve as directors with the use of 5 point Likert scale questions.  
Measurement of innovativeness by directors of the respective banks would provide better insights on the banks’ 
innovativeness based on the belief that the respondents had sound firm level information at their disposal. 
Under this study, innovativeness was ascertained by obtaining respondents’ answers to question three 
questions: 4a through to d; 5a&b and 6 a through to c.  Using 5 point Likert scale, the respondents were asked to 
indicate their agreement to the statements regarding whether their banks had rolled out innovative products, 
policies and structures to support innovation; included innovations in their strategic agenda and was actively 
pursuing innovations.  Scores of 1 indicated strong disagreement with the above statements, with scores of 5 
indicating strong agreement.   
3.5.2.5 Control Variables: Firm age and Firm performance 
In line with Bantel and Jackson (1989), this study was not intended to examine a complete model for innovation 
but rather to examine the role of board capital in firm innovativeness.  Based on prior literature, there are many 
other variables that impact innovation.  Two control variables were included in this study in keeping with the 
principle of parsimony.  It was necessary to control for the effect of firm age and firm performance to ensure that 
our findings were not confounded by their effect on firm innovativeness.  Consistent with Jermias and Gani (2014) 
as well as Chen et al., (2013), firm performance was controlled for because some studies have shown that 
unprofitable firms reduce their research and development expenditure (a proxy for innovation) with other studies 
suggesting that less profitable firms experiment with innovative activity. 
Following Chen et al., (2013), this study also controlled for firm age measured by number of years the bank 
had been in existence because some studies have shown a negative relationship between a firm’s age and research 
and development expenditure (a proxy of innovation).  Firm age was sourced from corporate web sites (appendix 
6) while firm performance was measured as firm’s profit before tax for the year ended 2015.  
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
Consistent with Haynes and Hillman (2010), the main effect of board human capital on innovativeness as a firm 
outcome was tested using multiple linear regression model.  Multiple regression was used to determine the 
presence of, and the strength of relationships between the independent and dependent variables.  Modelling was 
done to determine the causation between human capital of the board and firm innovativeness.  The effect of three 
predictor variables derived from human capital constructs on the single dependent variable (innovativeness) was 
ascertained and reported in chapter four.  Data was coded and analyzed with the use of SPSS.  Descriptive statistics 
as well as cross tabulation was used for data analysis and reporting.  
With the use of Pearson product-moment correlation, beta coefficients were calculated to determine the 
direction and extent of relationship between the individual human capital variables and innovativeness.  The matrix 
of coefficients was inspected for signs of multicollinearity.  Further tests on multicollinearity were conducted, 
including calculation of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).  The values were compared to the rule of thumb’s 10 or 
more values, the threshold indicating existence of multicollinearity (Salkind, 2007). 
Consistent with Chen (2014), this study made use of lagged hierarchical regression analysis.  First, the main 
effects variables (directors’ education, experience, and functional diversity) were successively introduced and 
regressed against the dependent variable.  Finally, the interactive effects (directors’ education * directors’ 
experience) as well as the control variables (firm age and firm performance) were introduced and regressed against 
the dependent variable.  For each model, Shrunken or adjusted ??  was computed to show the percentage of 
variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent or control variables in the model.   
3.6.1 Model Specification 
Review of available literature revealed that researchers continue to debate on the number of board capital variables 
to include in their model specifications.  Inclusion of a multitude of variables gives rise to duality of problems: 
weighting of those variables as they are not likely to affect the dependent variable with similar intensity as well as 
cumulative measurement errors.  Bhagat and Bolton (2008) argue that the measurement errors on simple variables 
such as board independence can be much less than the total measurement errors in measuring a multitude of 
variables.  Consistent with this viewpoint, our model specification included three independent, two control 
variables and one dependent variable – innovativeness.  The first model included the control variables, with the 
second incorporating the main effects, as follows:  
Model 1: ??? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ???????? 
Model 2: ???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ???????? 
The models allowed us to estimate the effects of board human capital on the firms’ innovativeness.  The variables 
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in the model were as follows:  ??? = dependent variable, innovativeness as measured by directors of the focal firm, on a 5 point Likert scale; ?? = constant ? = coefficients, for variables???, ??, ??, Fa and Pp described here below: ?? represents directors’ educational qualifications;  ?? represents directors’ experience, measured using a 5 point Likert-type question; ?? represents functional diversity measured using a 5 point Likert-type question; 
Two control variables were added to the main regression model, namely Firm age (Fa) and Firm performance (Fp).  
Fa represents firm age in terms of the number of years the bank has been in existence. This information was 
obtained from the corporate web sites;  
Fp is firm performance, measured by the focal firms’ profit before tax for the year ended 2015, and ? is the error term associated with unobservable factors driving innovativeness. 
3.6.1.1 Model assumptions 
Four principal assumptions were made regarding the model.  During data analysis stage of this, investigations were 
conducted on the observed data to ensure that the underlying assumptions had not been violated.  First, it had been 
assumed that observed variables will follow a normal distribution.  Consistent with Tarus & Omandi (2013), a plot 
of residuals was undertaken to validate the normal distribution.  Second, it had been assumed that the relationship 
between human and social capital of the board and firm innovativeness would be linear.  Third, an assumption of 
independence had been made for the observed data. With use of SPSS, we undertook Durbin-Watson test to check 
the data for autocorrelation similar to the study by Tarus & Omandi (2013).  Lastly, homoscedasticity was 
presumed, meaning that random errors had the same constant variance (Yan, 2009).   
 
4. Data analysis, Interpretation and Presentation 
This chapter presents the results of analysis performed on the primary as well as secondary data used for purposes 
of this study.  Primary data was sourced from responses to questionnaires designed for this study.  Secondary data 
was obtained from published sources.  We made use of both descriptive and inferential statistics to establish the 
presence and strength of relationships between board human and social capital and bank innovativeness.  
Consistent with Haynes and Hillman (2010), the main effect of board capital on innovativeness as a firm outcome 
was tested using multiple linear regression model.  Tests on multicollinearity were tested by calculation of 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).   
 
4.2 Response Rate and generalizability of results 
Out of the 43 questionnaires sent to selected respondents of the 43 commercial banks, 32 were completed and 
returned to the researcher, representing a 74.4% response rate.  This response rate is deemed appropriate as it 
exceeded the 70% threshold rule of thumb according to Kothari (2007).  The study results were deemed to be 
generalizable, principally based on two criteria.  First, the number of observations per independent variable not 
only exceeded the minimum acceptable threshold of five, but attained the desirable level of between fifteen and 
twenty, and second, the sample was representative, Hair et al, (2010).   
 
4.3 Robustness Tests  
4.3.1 Validity Test 
Prior to data collection, the instrument was subjected to face validity test.  Construct validity was achieved through 
initial discussions with two members of board of directors in the commercial banks as well as two members of 
university faculty.  This ensured face validity, criterion validity as well as content validity.  These reviews helped 
to address clarity of the questions as well as concerns on whether the scales captured the desired information.  The 
review by university faculty ensured that the study incorporates expert research experience accumulated in the 
faculty.  Feedback obtained from the reviews was incorporated into the final questionnaire.  
4.3.2 Reliability Test 
Consistent with Subramaniam and Youndt (2005), reliability was tested by calculating Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients for each board human and social capital constructs, as can be seen in table 4.3.2.1, below.  With the 
use of SPSS, coefficient alphas were calculated and found to be more than the rule of thumb values of 0.60 and 
0.70 as suggested by Zikmund et al., (2012) and De Vaus (2001) respectively.  From the results, it can be concluded 
that the constructs measured had the adequate threshold of reliability for the subsequent stages of analysis since 
all the Cronbach Alpha values were greater than 0.6.  
Table 4.3.2.1: Reliability Analysis  
 Variables  Number of items Cronbach Alpha 
Board Human Capital  9 0.672 
Innovativeness 9  0.770 
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4.3.3 Auto-correlation  
Similar to the study by Tarus & Omandi (2013), Durbin-Watson test was calculated to check the data for 
autocorrelation among variables. As can be seen in table 4.3.3.1, below, the Durbin-Watson statistic at 1.856 
suggests that the data is free from autocorrelation, based on Ott & Longnecker (2001)’s rule of thumb that critical 
values below 1.5 and above 2.5 give suspicion to positive or negative serial correlation. Based on these findings, 
the study concluded that linearity assumption obtained before proceeding to undertake multiple regression analysis.  
Table 4.3.3.1: Durbin Watson test 
Test Statistic(DW)   P-Value 
1.856 0.002b 
4.3.4 Test for Normality  
Normality test was undertaken by plotting the residuals, consistent with Tarus & Omandi (2013).  The variables 
were subjected to normality tests to check whether the data provided by the dependent variable (Y) was normally 
distributed, with the result included in appendix 8 reflecting a normal distribution, evidence that condition of 
normality for innovativeness is satisfied.  
Further results on the test of normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality shows negation of 
normality assumption since the p-value of 0.006 is less than 0.05 as shown in the table 4.3.4.1 below.  This is 
corroborated by the Shapiro-Wilk test, with p-value at .023 that is less than the .05, an indication that the data is 
not from a normally distributed population.  Whereas the numerical methods of testing normality are sensitive to 
sample sizes, from the normal distribution curve in appendix seven we discerned that the data was normally 
distributed and proceeded with further robustness tests. 
Table 4.3.4.1 Tests of Normality: 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic Df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
innovativeness_fp .191 31 .006 .922 31 .021 
4.3.5 Multicollinearity, Tolerance and VIF 
Multicollinearity is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more predictor variables in a multiple regression 
model are highly correlated.  We tested the independent variables data for multicollinearity by generating variance 
inflation factors (VIF), as can be seen in table 4.3.5.1 below.  We compared the VIF to the rule of thumb suggested 
by Zikmund (2007) that VIF above 5 indicate multicollinearity.  As the VIF for the variables are in the region of 
1, this study concluded there was no incidence of multicollinearity. The tolerance values are a measure of the 
correlation between the predictor variables and can vary between 0 and 1.  The closer to zero the tolerance value 
is for a variable, the stronger the relationship between the two predictor variables.  
Table 4.3.5.1: Multicollinearity, Tolerance and VIF 
Study Variable Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance              VIF 
   
Directors’ educational qualification 1.000 1.000 
Directors’ experience 1.000 1.000 
Interactive effect (education*experience) 1.000 1.000 
Functional Diversity 1.000 1.000 
4.3.7 Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity means that previous error terms are influencing other error terms and this violates the statistical 
assumption that the error terms have a constant variance. This was checked using normal P plots and scatter 
diagrams and there was no evidence of heteroscedasticity.  The Variance inflation factor (VIF) was checked in all 
the analysis and it ranged from above 1 to 4 which is not a cause of concern.  
 
4.4 Descriptive statistics   
As can be seen in table 4.4.1 below, respondents indicated that board functional diversity was high, closely 
followed by board education.  In general, respondents reported low director status and prestige relative to the other 
variables. In terms of the range, maximum score was attained in all the variables except for director status and 
prestige whose maximum score was three out of a possible five. Descriptive statistics are summarized in the table 
overleaf. 
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Table 4.4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Board education 32 2.00 5.00 4.45 .692 
Board experience 31 1.00 5.00 2.54 1.053 
Board functional diversity 32 2.00 5.00 4.31 .732 
 
4.5 Correlation Analysis 
Similar to the study by Tarus & Omandi (2013), this study made use of correlation analysis, the results of which 
are included in table 4.5.1.  These results reflect a positive and significant correlation between all the variables 
under study and innovativeness, except for the variable regarding presence of relationships between the director 
and the bank or chief executive.  In terms of robustness of the study, the correlation coefficients between the 
independent variables (education, experience, interlocks, diversity) range between -0.297 and 0.451, indicating 
that the correlations are not major. 
Table 4.5.1 
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
4.6 Regression Analysis 
Consistent with Haynes and Hillman (2010), the main effect of board human capital on innovativeness was tested 
using both Pearson correlation and linear regression.  In the case of regression analysis, the study utilized the 
lagged hierarchical regression analysis, similar to the approach used by Chen (2014), whereby impact of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable was ascertained one variable after the other.  Shrunken or adjusted ?? was computed to show the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent or 
control variables in the model.  The results are presented in table 4.6.1.  Model 1 presents study results of the effect 
of control variables on the dependent variables.  Model 2 presents the main effects.  
4.6.1 Control variables 
Model 1 revealed an R value (coefficient of determination) of 0.458, implying that the control variables explain 
45.8% of the variability of the dependent variable, innovativeness.  The F critical at 5 percent level of significance 
was 2.27.  Since F calculated is greater than the F critical (value =3.852) as shown in Table 4.6.1, this shows that 
the overall model was significant.  The significance is less than 0.05, indicating that the control variables explain 
variation in the dependent variable, innovativeness.  
With respect to impact of firm performance on innovativeness, the regression coefficient is 0.030.  This 
implies that firm performance accounts for 3% of bank’s innovativeness.  With p-value of 0.010, this is evidence 
that there is significant relationship between firm performance and bank innovativeness.  Regarding the second 
control variable, firm age, the regression coefficient is 0.020.  This implies that firm age accounts for 2% of bank’s 
innovativeness.  With p-value of 0.154 which is higher than 0.05, this implies that there is no significant positive 
relationship between firm age and innovativeness. 
4.6.2 Main effects 
Model 2 revealed an R value (coefficient of determination) of 0.747, implying that board education, board 
experience and functional diversity account for 74.7% of bank innovativeness.  In effect, the main effects as 
outlined explain 74.7% of the variability of the dependent variable, innovativeness.  The F critical at 5 percent 
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level of significance was 2.27.  Since F calculated is greater than the F critical (value =5.262) as shown in Table 
4.6.1, this shows that the overall model was significant.  The significance is less than 0.05, as demonstrated by p-
value of .001, indicating that the main effects explain variation in the dependent variable, innovativeness.  
This study has tested the hypotheses of this study.  First, with regard to hypothesis 1 that educational 
qualifications of directors have a significant effect on bank innovativeness, results in table 4.6.1 support this 
hypothesis.  This finding helped to reconcile disagreement in extant literature.  Wincent et al., (2010), Chen (2014) 
and Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) had found that educational qualifications of directors drive innovation while 
studies by Bantel & Jackson (1989) and Dalziel et al., (2011) had reported contradictory results.  The regression 
coefficient for this variable, at 1.546 and p-value of .035 is evidence that there is significant relationship between 
educational qualifications of directors and bank innovativeness.   
With respect to hypothesis 2 regarding impact of experience of directors on innovativeness, the results in 
table 4.6.1 support this hypothesis, consistent with the findings by Chen (2014).  The regression coefficient for 
this variable, at 0.228 and p-value of .001 is evidence that the there is significant relationship between experience 
of directors and bank innovativeness.   
Hypothesis 3 dealt with functional diversity of directors and its associated impact on innovativeness of banks. 
The results in table 4.6.1 support this hypothesis.  This study helped resolve controversy in extant literature, where 
Jackson et al., (1995), Yang (2014) and Wincent et al., (2010) found that functional diversity positively impacted 
innovativeness unlike Johnson et al., (2013) who observed that board heterogeneity can have potential for diversity 
of opinions that can create board conflict.  The regression coefficient for this variable, at 3.557 and p-values of .004 
is evidence that the there is significant relationship between functional diversity of directors and bank 
innovativeness.   
Table 4.6.1: Regression Results 
Variable Model 1  
Control variable 
Model 2  
Main effects 
Intercept 34.11 (1.69) 19.006(7.005) 
Board education   1.546(1.028)* 
Board experience  .228(.677)* 
Functional diversity  3.557(1.137)* 
Firm performance .030(.050)*  
Firm age .021(.039)  
R .458 .747 
R Square .210 .558 
Adjusted R Square .155 .452 
F 3.852* 5.262* 
Figures represent unstandardized coefficients. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. * indicate variable is 
significant at 5% 
Dependent Variable: innovativeness_fp 
 
4.7 Missing Data 
Two separate research questions were unanswered by two different respondents.  This incidence of missing data, 
well below ten percent, is an acceptable low level of missing data that did not warrant further diagnosis, Hair et 
al., (2010).  
 
5.0 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Summary 
The general objective of this research was to investigate the effect of board human capital on innovativeness of 
banks.  Specific objectives in this study were four.  First, to investigate the effect of educational qualifications of 
directors on innovativeness of banks.  Second, to assess the effect of directors’ experience on innovativeness of 
banks.  Third, to investigate the effect of functional diversity of directors on innovativeness of banks.  Finally, the 
interaction effect of directors’ education and experience on innovativeness of banks were also investigated.   
So as to achieve the objectives of the study, primary data was collected using a questionnaire that was developed 
and sent to managing directors of commercial banks in Kenya.  Telephonic and mail follow up was done to enhance 
response rate.  Data was coded and analyzed using statistical software.  Secondary data was obtained from the 
CBK website.   
Data collected was subjected to statistical tests with a view to validate that assumptions made obtained.  
Specifically, data was tested for reliability with the use of Cronbach alpha.  Auto correlation was tested using 
Durbin-Watson test while normality was tested vide Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests.  Variance 
inflation factors were computed to test data for multicollinearity as well as heteroscedasticity.  Descriptive statistics 
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were computed and used in data analysis.  Pearson correlation and linear regression was used to ascertain effect 
of board capital on innovativeness of commercial banks.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
This study examined impact of human capital on innovativeness of banks.  The findings help resolve tensions in 
extant literature on the role of human capital on innovativeness of banks.  Also, the findings help to reconcile 
disagreement in extant literature. The first objective regarding the effect of educational qualifications of directors 
on innovativeness of banks had a corresponding hypothesis that educational qualifications of directors have no 
statistically significant effect on innovativeness of commercial banks.  The regression coefficient for this variable, 
at 3.886 and p-value of .001 is evidence that the there is significant relationship between educational qualifications 
of directors and bank innovativeness.  The controversy found in extant literature regarding impact of educational 
qualifications of directors on innovativeness of banks indicated for instance has thus been resolved.  For instance, 
findings by Wincent et al., (2010), Chen (2014) and Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) suggesting that educational 
qualifications of directors drive innovation and which had been contradicted by findings by Bantel & Jackson 
(1989) and Dalziel et al., (2011) has been reconciled by this finding. 
The second objective aimed to assess the effect of directors’ experience on innovativeness of banks and had 
a corresponding hypothesis that experience of directors has no statistically significant effect on innovativeness of 
commercial banks.  The regression coefficient for this variable, at 0.482 and p-value of .017 is evidence that there 
is significant relationship between experience of directors and bank innovativeness.   
The third objective sought to investigate the effect of functional diversity of directors on innovativeness of 
banks and had a corresponding hypothesis that functional diversity of directors has no statistically significant effect 
on innovativeness of commercial banks.  The regression coefficient for this variable, at 3.921 and p-values of .000 
is evidence that there is significant relationship between functional diversity of directors and bank innovativeness.   
 
5.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
This study was not without limitations.  First, although response rate was 74%, the absolute number of observations, 
at 32 is marginally above the threshold of small samples, Hair et al., (2010).  Small samples inherently give rise 
to sampling errors and it is imperative for future research to increase the sample size perhaps by studying the 
service industry in multiple sectors, rather than undertaking a sector specific study.  This would enhance 
generalizability of the study findings.   
Secondly, the unit of analysis in this study was the board of directors.  Accordingly, the contribution of 
individual directors was not considered. Tian et al., (2011) advocate for research aimed at finding out how 
independent directors can contribute to the focal company.  It is imperative that future research is undertaken to 
ascertain the role played by individual directors on innovativeness of the focal company.  
 
5.4 Policy Recommendations 
This study has provided important insights that can be leveraged on by policy makers.  First, the corporate 
governance codes, for instance in Kenya, do not pronounce themselves on matters regarding educational 
qualifications of directors yet this variable seems to impact firm outcomes, e.g. innovativeness significantly.  This 
study therefore can benefit policy makers and management alike, by providing useful insights on inclusion of 
educational qualifications as part of the criteria to be considered in the appointment of directors.  Second, banks 
seeking to be innovative can also consider functional diversity and board member expertise, as these have 
empirically been shown to positively impact innovativeness in this study.  
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